This program is tentative and subject to change.
Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, but implementing it correctly has proven challenging. Prior work has focused on verifying DP at a high level, assuming either that the foundations are correct or that a perfect source of random noise is available. However, the underlying theory of differential privacy can be very complex and subtle. Flaws in basic mechanisms and random number generation have been a critical source of vulnerabilities in real-world DP systems.
In this paper, we present SampCert, the first comprehensive, mechanized foundation for executable implementations of differential privacy. SampCert is written in Lean with over 12,000 lines of proof. It offers a generic and extensible notion of DP, a framework for constructing and composing DP mechanisms, and formally verified implementations of Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms. SampCert provides (1) a mechanized foundation for developing the next generation of differentially private algorithms, and (2) mechanically verified primitives that can be deployed in production systems. Indeed, SampCert's verified algorithms power the DP offerings of Amazon Web Services, demonstrating its real-world impact.
SampCert's key innovations include:
(1) A generic DP foundation that can be instantiated for various DP definitions (e.g., pure, concentrated, Rényi DP);
(2) formally verified discrete Laplace and Gaussian sampling algorithms that avoid the pitfalls of floating-point implementations; and
(3) a simple probability monad and novel proof techniques that streamline the formalization.
To enable proving complex correctness properties of DP and random number generation, SampCert makes heavy use of Lean's extensive Mathlib library, leveraging theorems in Fourier analysis, measure and probability theory, number theory, and topology.
This program is tentative and subject to change.
Wed 18 JunDisplayed time zone: Seoul change
14:00 - 15:40 | |||
14:00 20mTalk | Verified Foundations for Differential Privacy PLDI Research Papers Markus de Medeiros New York University, Muhammad Naveed Amazon, Tancrède Lepoint Amazon, Temesghen Kahsai Amazon, Tristan Ravitch Amazon, Stefan Zetzsche Amazon, Anjali Joshi Amazon, Joseph Tassarotti New York University, Aws Albarghouthi Amazon, Jean-Baptiste Tristan Amazon DOI | ||
14:20 20mTalk | Automated Exploit Generation for Node.js Packages PLDI Research Papers Filipe Marques INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon, Mafalda Ferreira INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon, André Nascimento INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon, Miguel E. Coimbra INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon, Nuno Santos INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon, Limin Jia Carnegie Mellon University, José Fragoso Santos INESC-ID; Instituto Superior Técnico - University of Lisbon DOI | ||
14:40 20mTalk | Robust Constant-Time Cryptography PLDI Research Papers Matthew Kolosick University of California at San Diego, Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar Virginia Tech, Sunjay Cauligi ICSI, Marco Patrignani University of Trento, Marco Vassena Utrecht University, Ranjit Jhala University of California at San Diego, Deian Stefan University of California at San Diego DOI | ||
15:00 20mTalk | Smooth, Integrated Proofs of Cryptographic Constant Time for Nondeterministic Programs and Compilers PLDI Research Papers Owen Conoly Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Andres Erbsen Google, Adam Chlipala Massachusetts Institute of Technology DOI | ||
15:20 20mTalk | Morello-Cerise: A Proof of Strong Encapsulation for the Arm Morello Capability Hardware Architecture PLDI Research Papers Angus Hammond University of Cambridge, Ricardo Almeida University of Glasgow, Thomas Bauereiss University of Cambridge, Brian Campbell University of Edinburgh, Ian Stark University of Edinburgh, Peter Sewell University of Cambridge DOI |